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Abstract. While data from Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems is 
sent upstream, it is both the length of pulses as well as their frequency present an excellent op-
portunity to incorporate statistical fingerprinting. This is so, because datagrams in SCADA traffic 
follow a poison distribution. Although wrapping the SCADA traffic in a protective IPsec stream 
is an obvious choice, thin clients and unreliable communication channels make is less than ideal 
to use cryptographic solutions for security SCADA traffic. In this paper, we propose a smart 
alternative of data obfuscation in the form of Impulsive Statistical Fingerprinting (ISF). We pro-
vide important insights into our research in healthcare SCADA data security and the use of ISF. 
We substantiate the conversion of sensor data through the ISF into HL7 format and define poli-
cies of a seamless switch to a non HL7-based non-secure HIS to a secure HIS. 
Keywords: Cyber Security, SCADA/ICS Networks, Healthcare SCADA Systems, 
Health Level Seven, Impulsive Statistical Fingerprinting, Data Obfuscation, Encryption, 
Context-aware Security, IEEE 11073. 
1 Introduction 
Healthcare data has superior black market cyber value compared to financial data as 
noted by Trend Micro [1]. With an increasing number of personal healthcare records 
being digitised, for obvious reasons, the number of cyber-attacks on Health Information 
System has increased dramatically in the past few years [2]. 
The ISO/IEEE 11073 Personal Health Data (PHD) is a family of standards that ena-
bles medical/healthcare data to be exchanged between medical/healthcare/wellbeing 
devices and external computing systems. The Health Level Seven (HL7) has been 
providing data modelling and standardization support for almost 30 years. The succes-
sor of HL7 is the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) draft specification 
[3]. However, The FHIR specifications and its implementation are not within the scope 
of this paper. Rather, we chose to use HL7 due to its maturity. In fact, HL7 stays as the 
most widely accepted and adopted healthcare information sharing standard. 
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The ISO/IEEE 11073 and HL7 have successfully played a key role in enabling the 
medical devices to exchange data amongst themselves. Due to privacy and security 
issues, this data needs to be protected. Since medical devices are not typically compu-
tationally very proficient and the standards advocate lightweight communications, a 
cryptographic data security scheme is not an ideal solution to go ahead with [4]. In 
order to address this problem, we propose to use the statistical fingerprinting as data 
obfuscation method. 
The Impulsive Statistical Fingerprinting (ISF) was used by Crotti et al. to classify 
the network traffic for anomaly detection [5]. When network traffic shows an atypical 
pattern and skewness from the “normal” traffic pattern, this is raised as an anomaly to 
the system [6]. We use the ISF to prevent leaf sensors from broadcasting the actual 
readings. Since the ISO/IEEE 11073 allows the flexibility to transmit metadata in the 
HL7 packet, we calculate the statistical model proposed in this paper to calculate the 
obfuscated values from sensors before translating the communication in the HL7 for-
mat. 
The statistical model proposed in this paper assumes that the devices are already 
connected and configured in a network. An initial handshaking between PHDs and IP 
network provide the baseline values for mean calculation that will help in recalculating 
back to original values of the sensor data. From the results reported in [7] we learn that 
the PHDs send periodic metric report containing time stamp, and status value which 
reports device errors and alarms. The time stamps received from the devices helps keep 
both the TCP session [8] and time series data consistent. Using the statistical method 
proposed in [9], which assumes that the time series data is stationary, we consult to the 
history of the PHD values. We use the algorithm proposed in [9] and apply autoregres-
sive integrated moving average models to find the best fit of the time series model to 
past values of the time series. An adversary, who is using a Man-in-The-Middle 
(MiTM) attack, needs to know considerable amount of time series data to predict the 
future values. 
Following are the advantages of using statistical fingerprinting:  
1) There is virtually no extra overhead in the existing infrastructure,  
2) Adoption to the new solution is typically fairly straightforward and  
3) The obfuscation of the patient data complies with privacy laws of both Aus-
tralia [10] and Qatar [11], where the test-beds are planned for implementa-
tion and trial purposes. 
2 Paper Organisation 
Section III provides relevant definitions and background information on PHDs as well 
as the security and privacy goals. Section IV delivers the circumstantial account on the 
proposed method. Section V of the paper comprises a meticulous breakdown of the 
state-of-the-art in PHD security and privacy research. The concluding remarks have 
been discussed in section VI whereas the future works have been ventilated in section 
VII. 
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3 Background and Definitions 
Recent advances in the embedded technologies and their usage in the field of medicine 
[12] have increased the benefits of integrated digital patient data to the highest levels. 
Seamless availability of medical data through interconnected systems has been made 
possible through the presence of standards [13]. These standards have evolved over 
time and have served as the key driving force in advent of PHD clusters at one/different 
HISs. 
3.1 PHD Clusters and Inter/Intra Cluster Communication, Translation, and 
Addressing 
According to ISO/IEEE 11073 standard [13], the Personal Healthcare Devices (PHDs) 
communicate through IEEE 11073 agents with the 11073 manager through a plethora 
of communication interfaces. These communication interfaces may range from IPv6 
enabled Low powered Personal Area Networks (6LowPAN), Zigbee, Bluetooth, or 
802.11x etc [14]. The point to point communication among the PHDs has been left on 
user settings i.e. as per needed. The devices communicate to the outside world through 
a hierarchy that includes device agents that are associated intern with the agent manag-
ers. This helps in scaling the device clusters in a better way. 
3.2 Healthcare Data Security: Needs and Wants 
There has been a tremendous growth in breaches into medical and healthcare data [1]. 
Healthcare data consists of patients’ personal physical condition, financial information, 
private location information, images, videos, peers information, etc. Due to unavaila-
bility of legislation on collection of personal data in a HIS settings in the past and in-
creasing availability of healthcare archives, there is a great amount of unfiltered data in 
healthcare databases. The IEEE 11073 assumes very little responsibility of privacy and 
security of user data. The standard assumes that each user agent communicates with 
only one manager and each of them is free to keep their own copy of the data. The 
presence of these copies makes the layered architecture proposed in IEEE 11073, a 
vulnerable data network architecture. 
3.3 Data Obfuscation in Healthcare Information System 
Since data is kept archived in its original form at different layers of communication, the 
risk of data loss and corruption increases exponentially. There is a growing need for a 
data security protocol which secures the data in transit and in archives. Because the 
IEEE 11073 encourages interoperability of heterogeneous devices and simplicity of the 
infrastructure, it is impractical to get the whole industry to agree on a set of encryption 
scheme.  The PHDs have high diversity in computational power among themselves. 
Different encryption algorithms have different computational power [4]. We identify 
that there is a need for a lightweight data obfuscation scheme. 
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3.4 Statistical Fingerprinting 
Due to the constant data stream that is periodically transmitted by the PHDs and inabil-
ity of agreement to one encryption scheme, we propose to apply linear time series data 
aggregation algorithms to predict the next value [15] to calculate the autoregressive 
moving averages of the values that are generated by the PHDs. Using this statistical 
method, there is no need to change standards or manufacturer's device specifications. 
4 The Proposed System 
According to the IEEE 11073, the disease management devices fall in the 10400-10439 
domain of standards. The PHD agents typically have limited capabilities i.e. RAM, 
ROM, CPU, etc., connection to a single PHD manager, limited resource in power, they 
are fixed in their configurations, and unreliable connection to the managers. On the 
other hand, PHD managers are higher in abstraction layer to the PHD agents with mul-
tiple connections, richer power resources, and higher processing capability. The figure 
1 shows a typical PHD cluster scenario: 
 
Fig. 1. The Organisation of PHDs, Agents, and Managers in an IEEE 11073 compliant cluster. 
 
As shown in figure 1, the obfuscation layer that we propose in this paper resides 
between the agent and manager. We believe that the placement of obfuscation layer is 
critical considering the constraints posed by the device and the practice of data archiv-
ing as discussed in the previous section. 
Let k be the PHD value at a given time . 
Where, we have an array of values that a PHD generates and those values are inter-
related through a common source or by a common noise . So the range of 
values that are generated from the PHD initially is the sample base for the statistical 
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forecasting model that works on time series data. This series is generated by:  
. 
Since it is well known, the variance, . We can derive that if   
 be a numerically-valued discrete random variable with sample space and 
distribution function . 
 Now, if is added with the mean of the time series values, the original value can 
be obtained:  The expected value at PHD Agent is de-
fined by . The proposed scheme shall be considered valid if 
and only if . 
Where and are coefficients of consistency within the tolerance ranges of error. 
4.1 The Testbed 
We use the testbed presented in [16]: a testbed for monitoring the long term bedridden 
patients. The testbed consists of pressure sensors that generate events (pressure read-
ings) which generate time series data & triggers the IEEE 11073 compliant video cam-
era and can communicate to the PHD agent. There are 25 force sensitive sensors that 
are placed under the bedsheet in 5x5 strips manner. Each row of sensors is supported 
by the enamelled wiring and sown in a row into fabric for patient comfort. The sensors 
are arranged in the form of a matrix on the bed. The position of the sensors is adjustable 
according to the morphology and physiological features of the patient. The intensity of 
pressure/force on the sensors by a patient’s posture on laying position in bed is meas-
ured by the voltage amplitude. The implementation of the PHD agent is performed on 
the Arduino board that is attached with wires to the sensors. 
 
Fig. 2. Matrix of sensors in the long term bedridden patients and an Arduino board with PHD 
agents implementation and a host to the obfuscation layer algorithm. 
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The intensity of pressure/force on the sensors by patients’ posture on laying position 
in bed is measured by voltage amplitude. The implementation of the PHD agent is per-
formed on the Arduino board that is attached with wires to the sensors. The matrix of 
force sensors provide uniform data series. In order to achieve closeness to the real time 
environment, we introduce an event triggered digital camera. The data feed from the 
digital camera is routed to the IP network through the Arduino board. 
 
Fig. 3. The Flow chart of flow from the PHD to the agent and back. 
 
In figure 4, we present the sequence flow diagram of the protocol proposed. We 
propose that the PHD transmits the baseline values at initial handshake. This is achieved 
after initial DHCP. After the acquisition of the baseline values, the PHD starts sending 
variance of the values with respect to the previous value transmitted. This way, the 
burst frequency is reduced which will result into lesser network traffic and if the sensor 
values stay the same, the network will carry packets with zero data values in it. 
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Fig. 4. The sequence diagram of the protocol proposed. 
4.2 Multisensor Data Obfuscation through Statistical Fingerprinting 
The continuous time series data that PHDs send through PHD agents to the PHD man-
agers is in plain format in the conventional HIS. We propose that instead of sending 
sensor values, the variance from the previous value is sent. In [17], the algorithm for 
calculation of variance from an incoming data stream is reported. Using the stream of 
data carrying variance of sensor readings and mean from the baseline sensor readings, 
one can calculate the original sensor reading. This way, the data in transit stays obscure 
to the intruders. 
The initial handshake in the system is based on trust. That is the devices that are 
newly configured to the system, share their ‘native’ sensor readings with the agents: 
residing on the Arduino. It is only after a sizable sample, in our case 50 samples, or 
native values are stored as demonstrated by the authors in [9]. An interesting debate on 
the usability of Kalmans filter and statistical methods are found in [9] which assisted 
us in choosing the statistical methods for this particular scenario. 
The following notations describe the method of calculating the forecasted value for 
the time series under consideration using the statistical methods. This calculated value 
shall be used as the confidence value against packet injection attacks in a PHD net-
worked environment. Although the statistical methods have their shortcomings [18], 
we believe that an alternative incorporation of input verification method shall greatly 
benefit the security in the PHD based networking environment. 
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4.3 Conversion of Obfuscated data into HL7 format 
From [19], we learnt that conversion of data streams into HL7 format requires the pol-
icy engine that generates XML documents when provided with data source. In the cur-
rent scenario, we have two series of data streams for the policy engine: 1- time series 
data to be kept as a baseline sample for the statistical model, 2- Variance data as time 
series data. We plan to implement a new version of the conversion software into the 
Weka tool [20]. 
4.4 Threat Model for the Proposed Scheme 
In this section we discuss the threat model for the proposed scheme. As discussed ear-
lier, that the ISO/IEEE 11037 standards encourages the transit of healthcare data 
through various networked devices. Mostly, this data is in plain text format. This data 
in transit, while unencrypted, is a serious security and privacy threat.  
Let’s assume that Alice is an attacker who wants to steal the healthcare data. In con-
ventional environment, Alice will spoof network packets, or spoof IP of the PHD-Agent 
and request the latest sensor reading from the PHD. If the method proposed in this paper 
is adopted, the attacker will have the following scenarios to attack and steal the data.  
Through Packet Capture: If an attacker captures the packet that contains the PHD 
data, the attacker shall get variance from the data packet, which will not be of any use 
unless the attacker knows the mean of over the range of the values.  
Through Spoofing PHD-Agents IP address: This type of attack is typically classi-
fied as Man in The Middle (MiTM) attack. If Alice sends a decoy packet to the PHD 
agent and an association request, unless Alice has the statistical model, she cannot gen-
erate the mean from the baseline values and hence the attack will only be valid for the 
amount of time it takes to generate baseline values. 
5 Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
In our experiments, we extracted a sample set of 1400 readings from embedded tem-
perature sensor hosted on the Adruino. The following diagram shows the dataset: 
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Fig. 5. The sample data set. 
Lemma 1: Whether we can constitute the original value from variance and mean? 
We extracted the mean and variance of the sample values which were 20.65627 and 
0.00233 respectively. We determined that the reconstructed value was an exact match 
with the real value at the sensor. Whether this condition will still hold true for change 
in variance? - we rest this argument for the future work. 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of the Original Value at Sensor and Recalculation of Original Value at PHD 
Agent. 
Lemma 2: Whether the predicted value from the statistical model matches with the 
real value? 
In our observation, we noticed that the variance values for each sensor value pre-
dicted filled in perfectly in the gaps between the estimated value and the real value at 
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the sensor. In future, we aim at investigating the effectiveness of the statistical finger-
printing methods for different types of traffics. We also aim at testing these methods in 
different environments and investigate the effects of multi-sensor data fusion environ-
ments.  
In past, we proposed the method in [19] that addresses conversion of the healthcare 
data into HL7 format. Using statistical fingerprinting, the volume of traffic is reduced 
by 66.75%. This is so because the statistical model requires two previous neighbouring 
values to serve as a reference point. The HL7 packet is going to hold additional statis-
tical value within the packet to reflect the volume of the sample and variance of the 
values.  This also reflects in the power consumption of the transmitting nodes which is 
not within the scope of this paper. 
6 Related Works 
Martinez et al. [21] present the implementation of an end-to-end standard-based patient 
monitoring solution. They demonstrate that their implementation is incompliant with 
X73 and EN13606 standards. However, data security in the system proposed by Mar-
tinez et al. rely on the security strengths of its components i.e. database security. The 
data in transit and cache stored at each level, according to the IEEE standard, stays 
vulnerable. The authors of [22] have enumerated the threat space for the medical de-
vices. They go on to state that despite the vulnerabilities in the communication technol-
ogies, the data in transit is still vulnerable to attacks. Lee et al. [14] enumerate the 
interoperability challenges in the personal healthcare devices and also list that the data 
in transit as an issue that is unaddressed. In [23], Marc et al. present the case study of 
hospital image archive security on super clouds. They propose to use network services 
as the main computing power behind transfer and encryption/decryption of secure data. 
Delegation of AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) functions to the 
hypervisor might be considered rational but with increase in network volume, the idea 
of clouds of clouds might get in jeopardy. Zheng et al. [24] illustrate the application of 
blockchain technique in the PSN-based healthcare. The application of the blockchain 
in healthcare environment is unparalleled but since healthcare networks are hybrid in 
nature i.e. they consist of both thick and thin clients, blockchain might be overkill. An 
application of secure Internet of Things (IoT) in healthcare is proposed in [25]. On an 
IP-based network, on thin clients, the authors have proposed hashing messages and 
propose to use the hashing time as verification measure between the two processes. 
Since IoT is a de-centric concept, considerable amount of energies are invested in clock 
synchronisation. Timing-based process verification in absence of a/or two master 
clock(s) is risky.  In [26], the authors have implemented a standard complaint prototype. 
They have discussed the plug and play capabilities derived from X73 standards. In 
compliance with ISO11037, the authors have not discussed the issues like security of 
data in transit, security of data in storage, device security, connection security, etc. They 
have relied on the inherent security features of TCP/IP.  
Zhang et al. [27, 28] used statistical fingerprinting to detect peer-to-peer botnets 
through host-to-host traffic analysis. In [29], Trevor et al. is the RF fingerprinting for 
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feature selection in Zigbee emissions and in [30], Sucki et al. use spatial fingerprinting 
to improve security in wireless networks. The statistical fingerprinting provides an in-
vivo baseline to match the anomaly against, which is one of the most research areas in 
anomaly detection research. The foremost advantage of this non-crypto-based data ob-
fuscation scheme proposed in this research paper is the lightweightness, portability, 
scalability, with very nominal overhead costs. Lee et al. [31] discussed several cases 
where anomaly detection is hard in health care networks because attackers mask their 
traffic with the normal traffic. In this situation, signature-based or traffic pattern based 
anomaly detection is near impossible. They emphasize on the use of verified transac-
tions in the network which is an unrealistic assumption in large networks such that of 
health care networks.  Zhenyu et al. [32] and in [33,34] addressed large-scale internet 
of things and its application in health care through fog computing. Having considered 
the rapid volumetric increase in the IoT technology, unless the underlying flaws of the 
supportive technologies are fixed, the cyber security is going to stay as a major cause 
of concern[35,36]. 
The ISO/IEEE 11073 Personal Health Data (PHD) is a family of standards that ena-
bles medical/healthcare data to be exchanged between medical/healthcare/wellbeing 
devices and external computing systems. The Health Level Seven (HL7) has been 
providing data modeling and standardization support for almost 30 years. The successor 
of HL7 is the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) draft specification [3]. 
However, The FHIR specifications and its implementation are not within the scope of 
this paper. Rather, we chose to use HL7 due to its maturity. In fact, HL7 stays as the 
most widely accepted and adopted healthcare information sharing standard. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we presented our research using statistical fingerprinting before transfor-
mation of the healthcare data into HL7 format. We demonstrated that the statistical 
fingerprinting not only adds a semantic layer of security to the data, it can be performed 
locally at the data acquisition site without considerable overhead. The process of ISF is 
performed at the presentation stage of the data which means that the integrity of data is 
ensured. After the ISF is performed, the data is converted into HL7 format using the 
converter built in Java. If the data packet containing fingerprinted data is intercepted, 
an adversary will not be able to predict the value of the sensor unless s/he is physically 
present at the sensor site or has been present throughout the lifetime of the sensor send-
ing the fingerprinted data. We believe that the research presented in this paper is of 
significant value because it advocates for seamless of HIS into a more secure HIS with-
out considerable overhead or changes to the existing infrastructure. 
8 Future Works 
We aim at presenting a comprehensive comparative analysis of various encryption tech-
niques, data obfuscation techniques, and the scheme proposed in this paper in an HIS 
setting. This tasks requires analysis of “key-driving variables” in a Health Information 
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System (HIS), foresighted strengths and weaknesses of cryptographic schemes, and de-
velopment of context in order to choose the right data security scheme. We also plan to 
develop an adversarial model for the scheme proposed. 
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